

Chaotic-Map Method for Detection and Diagnosis of CPU-GPU Hybrid Computing Systems

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
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Outline

1. Background
2. Chaotic map method
3. Diagnosis of hybrid systems
4. Codes and experimental results

Inherent Failures in Exascale Computing Systems

- Exascale computing systems are expected to have millions of processor cores and other components.
 - components with expected life-span of ten years
 - $\sim 100\text{k hours/component} = 10 \text{ failures/hour}$ among 1M components
 - codes that run for a few hours likely experience failures of several components.
- Failure rates limit the effectiveness of current check-point/recovery methods:
 - Recovery times could be hours for Exascale systems
 - transient silent errors may lead to erroneous computations
- Failures will be integral part of Exascale computations – must be explicitly accounted
 - code outputs must be quantified with confidence estimates
 - specific to system failure profile
 - justifiable by measurements



Related Areas: Resilient Computations

- Foundational works:
 - von Neumann studied (in 1950s) mathematical aspects of achieving reliable computations over systems with unreliable components
 - subsequent reliability improvements in computing systems, perhaps, led to such studies not being extensively continued
 - Several fault detection problems in digital systems are known to be NP-hard
- Deployed systems: computing systems in satellites
 - deployed over past decades - enhanced with Software-Implemented Hardware Fault Tolerance (SIHFT) methods to counteract errors due to radiation in space environments.

But, Exascale computations present new challenges:

- sheer size and system complexity makes dynamic profiling of the failures and robustness complicated
- computation becomes inherently probabilistic:
 - for most applications, 100% guarantee of robustness against failures is not possible
 - requires confidence measures for code outputs – running to completion is not sufficient

Undecidability of Resilient Computations and Proofs

Addressed computational aspects of resilient computations under broad class of faults

Resilient computations present significant computational challenges:

- (a) asserting resiliency of computations is non-computable
- (b) mathematical proofs of resilience of algorithms are undecidable

These problems are not solvable in general form by computations and mathematical proofs alone: but,

- resilient computations can be designed for specific classes
- additional fault detection methods could make some problems computable

In general, these results motivate: deeper investigations of fault classes and resilient computations customized for them with complementary information

Reference: Resilience 2014 paper

Chaotic Poincare maps

Poincare Map: $M : \mathbb{R}^d \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^d$

$$X_{i+1} = M(X_i)$$

Trajectory

$$X_0, X_1, X_2, \dots$$

Examples:

logistic map: $X \in [0,1]$


$$M_{L_a}(X) = aX(1-X)$$

tent map: $X \in [0,1]$

$$M_T(X) = \begin{cases} 2X & \text{if } X \leq 1/2 \\ 2(1-X) & \text{if } X > 1/2 \end{cases}$$

Hennon map

$$M_H(X, Y) = (a - X^2 + bY, X)$$



Simple computations generate seemingly complex trajectories

Chaotic maps amplify state errors and spread across bit-space

Chaotic trajectory: X_0, X_1, X_2, \dots is chaotic if

(i) it is not asymptotically periodic, and

(ii) Lyapunov exponent is positive


$$L_M = \ln \left| \frac{dM}{dX} \right| > 0$$

Key Properties:

(i) Extreme sensitivity: small differences in states rapidly diverge

(ii) Wide Fourier spectrum: few iterates cover bit-space

differences between two trajectories



one of the states corrupted at $t=50$

Poincare maps for fault detection

Poincare maps computed in parallel at different computing units: fault at one will lead to quick divergence of the outputs, depending on:

- **Type of faults:** Wide range of faults in
 - arithmetic and logical operations
 - registers and memorybut are limited to those in operations used by $M(\cdot)$
- **Poincare map properties:** Computation of $M(\cdot)$
 - sensitive to errors
 - in constituent operations, and
 - mechanisms used in storing and updating the states
 - rate of divergence and its detectability depends on the Lyapunov exponent
 - generally, larger Lyapunov exponent values lead to quicker divergence
 - for tent map, $L_M = \ln 2 > 0$ except at $X=1/2$

Side Note: Codes with known outputs are routinely used for diagnosis of computing systems – Poincare maps are among the least complex

Chaotic-Identity Map

Poincare map amplifies errors in operations used in its own computation

Chaotic-Identity Map:

$$\begin{aligned} X_i^0 &\leftarrow I_D(X_i) \\ X_{i+1} &\leftarrow M(X_i^0) \end{aligned}$$


Execution routed through

- computing operations
- memory locations
- interconnect links

to capture errors in them

Output $I_D(X_i)$ is identical to X_i if there are no faults

It catches errors in specified operations – instructions, sub-routines, libraries



Chaotic-Computing Map: Identity computations replaced by other operations

Summary: Proof-of-Principle Detection Codes

Initial codes developed and tested on these systems

- i. Single-Host System Diagnosis
 - Multiple Cores: pthreads - **delivered to OLCF**
 - 4-core Intel Xeon 2.67GHz; 16-core 16-core AMD Opteron; 32-core Intel Xeon 2.7GHz; 48-core AMD Opteron 2.29GHz
 - GPU Accelerators: CUDA C - **delivered to OLCF**
 - Single-GPU: Quadro 600, Tesla T10, Tesla C1060, Tesla K20X
 - Multiple-GPU: 8 Tesla T10
- ii. Multi-Host Hybrid Systems Diagnosis
 - Multi-host, mutli-cores system: MPI+pthread
 - Multi-host, single GPU system: MPI+ CUDA C
 - Multi-host, multi-core, single GPU: MPI+pthread+ CUDA C

Systems Used in Tests:

Lens:

77-node linux cluster: 16-core/node 2.3 GHz AMD Opteron; 32 nodes with NVIDIA Tesla C1060


Titan:

OLCF supercomputer: 18,688 nodes: 16-core/node AMD Opteron 2.2GHz; unconventional NVIDIA Kepler Tesla K20X

Chester:

"test" version of Titan: 95 nodes

Hybrid Computing System Architecture



Titan: Cray XK7

XK7 Compute Node Characteristics



AMD Opteron 6274
16 core processor @ 141 GF

Tesla K20x @ 1311 GF

Host Memory
32GB
1600 MHz DDR3

Tesla K20x Memory
6GB GDDR5

Gemini High Speed Interconnect




System:

200 Cabinets
18,688 Nodes
27 PF
710 TB



Cabinet:

24 Boards
96 Nodes
139 TF
3.6 TB



Board:

4 Compute Nodes
5.8 TF
152 GB


Overall Detection Approach

Chaotic-Map Method:

- Compute chaotic maps in parallel on "all" nodes and paths
- Compute follow-on maps on "reliable" nodes

Implementations: system specific

- Multi-core systems: pthreads
- GPUs: CUDA C block-threads
- Multi-node CPU+GPU systems:
 - threads+CUDA+MPI



• **Detection:** "errors" amplified by chaotic maps:


- in-situ
- follow-on computations

• **Diagnosis:** may require additional codes

Implementation: Single Nodes


Multi-Core Node:

- pthreads: chaotic map trajectory on every core




AMD Opteron 6274

- 16 cores
- 141 GFLOPs peak



GPU Accelerator:

- CUDA C kernel: chaotic map threads on every block




NVIDIA Tesla K20x

- 14 Streaming Multiprocessors
- 2,688 CUDA cores
- 1.31 TFLOPs peak (DP)
- 6 GB GDDR5 memory
- HPL: >2.0 GFLOPs per Watt (Titan full system measured power)




Implementation: Hybrid Systems




CPU Multi-Core Results Summary

All CPU chaotic-map output results match:


- Match to the bit on AMD Opteron and Intel cores
- Floating point operations are IEEE 754 compliant



16-core/node
2.3 GHz AMD Opteron



16-core/node
AMD Opteron 22.2GHz



16-core/node
AMD Opteron 22.2GHz

GPU Computations:

Different GPU blocks of same GPU producing different answers in some cases:

- Observed when integer and fractional variables are mixed on GPU blocks
- Observed on multiple GPUs, and repeatable
- Implications are not entirely understood – potentially destabilize certain non-linear computations

Example run: titan

```
I have no name!@nid06983:/tmp/work/nrao> ./diag_gpu_titan
```

```
Device Name: Tesla K20X
```

```
[deviceProp.major.deviceProp.minor] = [3.5]
```

```
multi-processor count = 14
```

```
warp_size = 32
```

```
cudaGetDevice()=0
```

```
CPU:      Number of cores detected=16
```

```
GPU:      Number of threads=100;      Number of blocks=50
```

```
chaotic map:      x=0.200000;      l=4.000000;      n=10000
```

GPU: Chaotic Map

```
block_x[0]= 0.682320 <-> 3F2EAC8E }
block_x[1]= 1.682320 <-> 3F2EAC8E }
block_x[2]= 2.682321 <-> 3F2EAC90 }
block_x[3]= 3.682321 <-> 3F2EAC90 }

block_x[13]=13.682321 <-> 3F2EAC90 }
block_x[14]=14.682321 <-> 3F2EAC90 }
block_x[15]=15.682321 <-> 3F2EAC90 }
block_x[16]=16.682320 <-> 3F2EAC80 }
block_x[17]=17.682320 <-> 3F2EAC80 }
```

Output: fractional part is Chaotic-map state
-not identical across the blocks of same GPU

may "appear" same under C printf but different



Tesla K20X

GPU Computations: follow-on chaotic map trajectory

Example run: titan

I have no name!@nid06983:/tmp/work/nrao> ./diag_gpu_titan

GPU: Chaotic Map

Follow-on Chaotic Map

Follow-on linear Map

block_x[0]=0.682320 <-> 3F2EAC8E

block_x[0]=0.682320 <-> 0.860477

block_x[0]=0.682320 <-> 0.000016

block_x[1]=1.682320 <-> 3F2EAC8E

block_x[1]=1.682320 <-> 0.860477

block_x[1]=1.682320 <-> 0.000016

block_x[2]=2.682321 <-> 3F2EAC90

block_x[2]=2.682321 <-> 0.000000

block_x[2]=2.682321 <-> 0.000016

block_x[3]=3.682321 <-> 3F2EAC90

block_x[3]=3.682321 <-> 0.000000

block_x[3]=3.682321 <-> 0.000016

block_x[4]=4.682321 <-> 3F2EAC90

block_x[4]=4.682321 <-> 0.000000

block_x[4]=4.682321 <-> 0.000016

block_x[5]=5.682321 <-> 3F2EAC90

block_x[5]=5.682321 <-> 0.000000

block_x[5]=5.682321 <-> 0.000016

block_x[6]=6.682321 <-> 3F2EAC90

block_x[6]=6.682321 <-> 0.000000

block_x[6]=6.682321 <-> 0.000016

block_x[7]=7.682321 <-> 3F2EAC90

block_x[7]=7.682321 <-> 0.000000

block_x[7]=7.682321 <-> 0.000016

block_x[8]=8.682321 <-> 3F2EAC90

block_x[8]=8.682321 <-> 0.000000

block_x[8]=8.682321 <-> 0.000016

block_x[9]=9.682321 <-> 3F2EAC90

block_x[9]=9.682321 <-> 0.000000

block_x[9]=9.682321 <-> 0.000016

block_x[10]=10.682321 <-> 3F2EAC90

block_x[10]=10.682321 <-> 0.000000

block_x[10]=10.682321 <-> 0.000016

block_x[11]=11.682321 <-> 3F2EAC90

block_x[11]=11.682321 <-> 0.000000

block_x[11]=11.682321 <-> 0.000016

block_x[12]=12.682321 <-> 3F2EAC90

block_x[12]=12.682321 <-> 0.000000

block_x[12]=12.682321 <-> 0.000016

block_x[13]=13.682321 <-> 3F2EAC90

block_x[13]=13.682321 <-> 0.000000

block_x[13]=13.682321 <-> 0.000016

block_x[14]=14.682321 <-> 3F2EAC90

block_x[14]=14.682321 <-> 0.000000

block_x[14]=14.682321 <-> 0.000016

block_x[15]=15.682321 <-> 3F2EAC90

block_x[15]=15.682321 <-> 0.000000

block_x[15]=15.682321 <-> 0.000016

block_x[16]=16.682320 <-> 3F2EAC80

block_x[16]=16.682320 <-> 0.671719

block_x[16]=16.682320 <-> 0.000016

block_x[17]=17.682320 <-> 3F2EAC80

block_x[17]=17.682320 <-> 0.671719

block_x[17]=17.682320 <-> 0.000016

block_x[18]=18.682320 <-> 3F2EAC80

block_x[18]=18.682320 <-> 0.671719

block_x[18]=18.682320 <-> 0.000016

block_x[19]=19.682320 <-> 3F2EAC80

block_x[19]=19.682320 <-> 0.671719

block_x[19]=19.682320 <-> 0.000016

block_x[20]=20.682320 <-> 3F2EAC80

block_x[20]=20.682320 <-> 0.671719

block_x[20]=20.682320 <-> 0.000016

block_x[21]=21.682320 <-> 3F2EAC80

block_x[21]=21.682320 <-> 0.671719

block_x[21]=21.682320 <-> 0.000016

block_x[22]=22.682320 <-> 3F2EAC80

block_x[22]=22.682320 <-> 0.671719

block_x[22]=22.682320 <-> 0.000016

Follow-on chaotic maps

follow-on linear maps

CPU:

diverge significantly

May "absorb" the differences

n_iter:10000: x_0:0.200000 l:4.000000, x_n:0.682320

logistic_map:0.682320 <-> 0.860477

linear_map 0.682320 <-> 0.000016

x_n=3F2EAC8E

Operational “Artifacts” Discovered

Execution of diagnosis codes led to the discovery of “operational artifacts”

GPU-emulations and incorrect executions: code delays

- Unless explicitly tested for presence of GPUs, codes may be
 - executed in “emulated mode”: long execution times
 - incorrectly executed: incorrect results
- Resolved by explicitly checking for “physical” GPUs

Data transfers errors when MPI is used to launch CUDA kernels

- Outputs from certain blocks has zero fractional part:
 - Happens randomly but always the GPU block number matches the node number
- Implications are not entirely understood – potentially destabilize certain non-linear computations

Simulation Results

We simulate three types of errors:

- i. ALU errors corrupt state by a multiplier
 - bit flip to 1 in ALU registers
- ii. memory errors clamp state to a fixed value
 - stuck-at fault in RAM
- iii. cross-connect errors modify state by a multiplier.
 - link transmission error

Nodes transition to a faulty mode with probability p , and once transitioned




- errors type (i) and (ii) are permanent,
- error type (iii) lasts only for a single time step

Simulation Results: No Faults

Case of no faults:

10-node pipeline of depth $k = 10$

- none are detected
- all chaotic time traces are identical across nodes






(a) no failures

Simulation Results

Stuck-at faults:

- full pipeline, spanning all 10 nodes
- trajectories disrupted by faulty nodes
- detection within one time step



(b) full pipeline for stuck-at failures

Simulation Results

Pipeline of single chain




- executed by one node at time
- chain “sweeps” across nodes in time

Both faults are detected:

- detection delayed until the chain reaches faulty node

The total computational cost:

- 1/10 of the case (b)
- detection achieved, albeit delayed by few time steps






c) sparse pipeline for stuck-at failures

Simulation Results

Transient fault in interconnect payload lasted for one time unit

Full pipeline spanning all nodes will detect such failure

Pipeline of two chains with periodicity of 5 nodes is able to detect



(d) transient failure

Simulation System

Simulations on 48-core Linux workstation: 2.23GHz AMD Opteron processors

Computation on a single processor core and delay of 10 micro seconds to simulate the latency of interconnect.

- $N = 500,000$ nodes: runtimes under 2 seconds for
 - logistic map and a pair of reciprocal operations (5 operations for CI-map).

First-order approximation: for CI-map


- 10 operations each with 10 micro seconds execution time, and
- interconnect with 10 microsecond latency

pipeline execution time is 11 seconds for $N=100,000$

All chains of PCC^2 -map are computed in parallel

- execution time scales linearly in N
- under 2 minutes for million computing nodes


HP Proliant 48-core Linux workstation: 2.23GHz AMD Opteron processors



Four sockets
8 Dyes
48 cores

Diagnosis output

HP Proliant 48-core Linux workstation:
2.23GHz AMD Opteron processors



System times:

user time: 9998.000000 useconds

kernel time : 23996.000000 useconds

Diagnosis Summary:

Core 0:	output:	0.000000	simulated errors
Core 1:	output:	0.492877	
Core 2:	output:	0.076975	
Core 3:	output:	0.932237	no errors
Core 4:	output:	0.932237	
Core 5:	output:	0.932237	
...			
Core 41:	output:	0.932237	
Core 42:	output:	0.932237	
Core 43:	output:	0.932237	
Core 44:	output:	0.932237	
Core 45:	output:	0.932237	
Core 46:	output:	0.932237	
Core 47:	output:	0.932237	

System Profiling and Application Tracing

System Diagnosis and Profiling:

- executed at the beginning for an initial system profile
 - repeated periodically or triggered by failure events.
- typically, all system resources are devoted for initial profiling
- our method:
 - execute diagnosis modules customized to static and silent failures in processing nodes, memory units and interconnects
 - generate robustness estimates from outputs of diagnosis modules.

Application Tracing:

- diagnosis modules are strategically inserted into application codes
 - during compilation or preprocessing
- confidence measures are estimated for their outputs.

Basic idea: execution paths of these tracer codes “follow” along the same components as the application codes:

- processing nodes, memory elements and interconnect links,

Require “new” detection, profiling and tracing theory and algorithms:

Failure detection: schedule application around, replace nodes

Failure likelihood: set application fault tolerance, estimate confidence

Our Approach

Our approach: synthesis of methods from fault diagnosis, chaotic Poincare maps, and statistical estimation:

a) Diagnosis methods: identify computation errors due to component failures, in arithmetic and logic unit (ALU), memory and cross-connect, by strategically guiding the execution paths:

- i. system diagnosis pipelines
- ii. application traces

b) Poincare maps amplify effects of component failures making them quickly detectable,

c) Statistical estimation methods process data from execution traces to generate

- i. system robustness profiles
- ii. confidence estimates for applications

Confidence Estimates

Outputs of CI-maps are used to generate confidence measures for executions, particularly if no failures are detected

$I_D(.)$; $M(.)$ executed at rate R_p
- once every $1/R_p$ seconds

P_{1/R_p} probability of node failure during $1/R_p$ sec


Under statistical independence
probability of failure during N_p executions

$$1 - \left(1 - P_{1/R_p}\right)^{N_p}$$

Confidence: $C(\alpha, N_p)$
that node failure probability is less than α

If no failures are detected in N_p executions

$$C(\alpha, N_p) = P\left\{P_{1/R_p} < \alpha\right\} > 1 - 2^{-2\left[1 - (1 - \alpha)^{N_p}\right]^2 N_p}$$



Confidence Estimate for Triplicated Application

Application triplicated with majority vote at each step:

- error-free under single faults
- makes error if there are two or more faults within “unit” time T_U

Application executed for duration T with application tracing detecting \hat{N}_T faults:

if two or more faults detected within “unit” time: check-point

if single are no fault detected in all unit times:

confidence that application is error-free

$$C(T, \alpha) = 1 - P\{N_{T_U} > 1\} > 1 - \left(\frac{\hat{N}_T}{T} + \alpha \right)$$

with probability $\delta = 1 - ae^{-b\alpha^2 T^2}$

under statistically independent component failures

Qualitatively, confidence

- improves with lower number of faults detected
- improves with longer tracing period:
 - longer T means higher δ


Note: zero errors do not imply 100% confidence

Derivation of Confidence Estimate: Outline

By Hoeffding's Inequality we have

$$P\left\{\left|1 - \left(1 - P_{1/R_p}\right)^{N_p}\right| > \epsilon\right\} < 2e^{-2\epsilon^2 N_p}$$

$$P\left\{P_{1/R_p} < \alpha\right\} > 1 - 2e^{-2\left[1 - (1 - \alpha)^{N_p}\right]^2 N_p}$$



General Confidence Estimate:

If failures are detected in \hat{P}_E fraction of N_p executions

General confidence estimate:

$$C(\alpha, N_p) = P\left\{P_{1/R_p} < \alpha\right\} > 1 - 2e^{-2\left[1 - (1 - \alpha)^{N_p} - \hat{P}_E\right]^2 N_p}$$

Derivation: By Hoeffding's Inequality we have

$$P\left\{\left|\left(1 - P_{1/R_p}\right)^{N_p} - \hat{P}_E\right| > \epsilon\right\} < 2e^{-2\epsilon^2 N_p}$$

$$P\left\{\left|P_{1/R_p} - \hat{P}_E\right| < \beta\right\} > 1 - 2e^{-2\left[1 - (1 - \beta)^{N_p}\right]^2 N_p}$$

Confidence Estimate for Replicated Application: General Case

Application replicated $2\gamma + 1$ times with majority vote at component level:

- error-free under γ faults or fewer faults
- makes error if there are $\gamma + 1$ or more faults within “unit” time

Application executed for duration T with application tracing detecting \hat{N}_T faults
if two or more faults detected within “unit” time: check-point
if single are no fault detected in all unit times:
confidence that application is error-free

$$C(T, \gamma, \epsilon) = 1 - P\{N_U > \gamma\} > 1 - \left(\frac{\hat{N}_T}{T\gamma} + \frac{\alpha}{\gamma} \right)$$






with probability $\delta = 1 - ae^{-b\alpha^2 T^2}$

under statistical independence of component failures

Qualitatively, confidence

- improves with lower number of faults detected
- improves with longer tracing period
- also, improves with replication level

Architecture and core definition



- 32 SFU units
- 1 double op/cycle
- Supports transcendentals

Execution Path – Xeon Phi

- Different compiler switches exercise different parts of hardware

- `$ icc -mmic diag_multicore_light.c` (default)

Core 0: output: 0.940222 : 3E2F8EBE

...

Core 227: output: 0.940222 : 3E2F8EBE

- `$ icc -mmic diag_multicore_light.c -no-vec`

Core 0: output: 0.940222 : 3E2F8EBE

...

Core 227: output: 0.940222 : 3E2F8EBE

- `$ icc -mmic diag_multicore_light.c -fimf-precision=high`

Core 0: output: 0.940222 : 3E2F8EBE

...

Core 227: output: 0.940222 : 3E2F8EBE

- `$ icc -mmic diag_multicore_light.c -fimf-arch-consistency=true`

Core 0: output: 0.936652 : 5E46ED57

...

Core 227: output: 0.936652 : 5E46ED57

- `$ icc -mmic diag_multicore_light.c -fp-model strict`

Core 0: output: 0.932237 : 938210F1

...

Core 227: output: 0.932237 : 938210F1

- `$ icc -mmic diag_multicore_light.c -fp-model precise -fp-model source`

Core 0: output: 0.932237 : 938210F1

...

Core 227: output: 0.932237 : 938210F1

Agreement with
xeon and opteron

Conclusions

Our approach

- (i) utilizes light-weight computations based on chaotic and identity maps to detect certain classes of errors in computations, and
- (ii) implementation for diagnosis of multi-core processors, GPUs, and hybrid systems
 - tested on three hybrid systems:
 - 4 multi-core processors
 - 4 GPUs

This approach is suitable for exascale systems:

- (a) low computational requirements
- (b) linear scaling of the execution time

both for system profiling and application tracing

Future Work:

- These results are only a very first step
 - Implementations for high-performance machines and clusters
 - Incorporation of failure classes and application footprints
- More analysis and simulations needed
 - understand and quantify classes of errors detected by a given set of Poincare and identity maps

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- N. S. V. Rao, Resiliency in Exascale systems and computations using chaotic-identity maps, Workshop on Resiliency in High Performance Computing in Clusters, Clouds and Grids (Resilience 2012), 2012, extended abstract, invited talk.
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- N. S. V. Rao, Fault detection and profiling algorithms for exascale computing Systems, <https://collab.mcs.anl.gov/display/examath/Submitted+Papers>
- N. S. V. Rao, Confidence estimation for exascale computations, <https://collab.mcs.anl.gov/display/examath/Submitted+Papers>

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Fault diagnosis

- N. S. V. Rao and S. Toida, On polynomial-time testable combinational circuits, IEEE Transactions on Computers, vol. 43, no. 11, 1994, pp. 1298-1308.
- N. S. V. Rao, Expected-value analysis of two single fault diagnosis algorithms, IEEE Transactions on Computers, vol. 42, no. 3, 1993, pp. 272-280.
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Chaotic Maps

- N. S. V. Rao, J. Gao, L. O. Chua, On dynamics of transport protocols in wide-area Internet connections, in Complex Dynamics in Communication Networks, L. Kocarev and G. Vattay (editors), 2005, pp. 69- 102.
- J. Gao, N. S. V. Rao, J. Hu, J. Ai, Quasi-periodic route to chaos in the dynamics of Internet transport protocols, Physical Review Letters, 2005.

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Thank you